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any interest in "abstractions, '44 and despite the basic constitutional approach
of balancing felt needs against restrictive effects, there is virtually no considera-
tion of possible constitutional requirements.4" For example, Professor Brown
either explicitly accepts,46 or at least does not object on principle,47 to member-
ship in the Communist Party being treated as an automatic disqualification for
employment. Yet membership in the party was legal for years, still is not an
automatic crime, and probably could not constitutionally be made so. Further,
the Communist ideal and the Marxist doctrine generated one of the great
movements of history. As a matter of political theory and history, it can be
asserted that the first amendment was designed to protect the right of the
people to exposure to ideas which have vast consequences, as well as to those
which have none. Admitting the reality of our power struggle with Russia,
the loyalty and security programs are an integral part of a comprehensive legal
structure which clashes with this theory and history, and in their full sweep
the programs are justified by no countervailing republican political theory
that I have ever seen expressed. This clash is a basic issue of our time. I should
like to have seen it discussed as such in the book.
BURKIE MARSHALLt
THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE. By Alan F. Westin. New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. viii, 183. $1.60.
PROFESSOR WESTIN'S book, intended to supplement the traditional constitu-
tion law casebook by calling attention to developments which precede, and
presumably affect and account for, Supreme Court decisions, is a "documen-
tary portrait," rather than an interpretative monograph, of Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer,' the Steel Seizure Case of 1952. Beginning with a
summary of the steel crisis drawn from "The News of the Week in Review"
of the New York Times for April 6, 1952,2 the book moves chronologically
through materials demonstrating President Truman's reasons for the seizure 8
and the industry's response,4 then follows the resulting litigation step by step.
Well-edited selections from the proceedings, briefs, oral arguments, and judi-
cial opinions show how the doctrine of inherent presidential power to seize
was early put forward by the Government, only to be jettisoned when it fell
under constant attack by the companies. The opinions of District judge David
Pine and six Supreme Court Justices provide contrasting modern statements
of the doctrine that the King is under law. Throughout, Westin's comments
44. P. 478.
45. See pp. 408-10.
46. See p. 265.
47. See pp. 381-82.
t'Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
2. P. 2.
3. Pp. 8, 14.
4. Pp. 18, 46.
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make the steps in the case easy to take, keeping the reader aware of develop-
ments outside the narrow confines of the case.5
No new information about the Steel Seizure Case is to be found here; the
book's value arises rather from its beginning-to-end treatment of a constitu-
tional law case. This little-used approach 6 has much to commend it. Case his-
tories enable students to observe the effect of competing strategies as a case
moves up the appellate ladder and to pinpoint the roles played by all the actors
in a litigation, thus leading to an appreciation of the fascinating complexity
of the judicial process. The more widespread use of case histories could cor-
rect any tendencies to treat constitutional rules in a vacuum, and Supreme
Court decisions in terms of one or two factors when in reality countless forces
mold each decision. It must be said that the present volume provides little real
insight. Yet the possible utility of the case history approach as a tool for
understanding the decisionmaking process of the Supreme Court is, to me, its
most valuable attribute.
Casebooks are inherently unequal to the task of illustrating the nature of
constitutional change. Ordinarily their purpose is limited to the exposition of
currently accepted rules. Supplements and new editions ensure that students
are alerted to the latest authoritative rulings of the Supreme Court. But if one
facet of coping with change is learning the current rules, surely another is
ascertaining those factors which account for the Court's departure from old
ones. The study of what the Constitution means today should be the beginning
rather than the end of formal courses in the subject. Consciously developed
and carefully stated theories of constitutional change would not only have
obvious serviceability for practicing lawyers but also hold significant educa-
tional value for all citizens in achieving a broader understanding of the Su-
preme Court. One wonders if the snapshot of constitutional law found in the
casebook of 1910, 1930, or 1950 does not, in some small degree, account for
the cries of outrage currently heard from prominent law yers, judges, and even
professors, over recent Supreme Court overrulings.
As in the art of biography, a central task in the craft of preparing case his-
tories is striking a balance among the various factors which shape the end
result. What are the contributions of social environment, of technical develop-
ments, of chance, and of personality? The sheer complexity of the subject
5. In particular, a James Reston column and President Truman's Memivirs are u 'ed
to show how damaging some people believed a strike would be to fulfilling American
commitments in the Korean War. Pp. 85, 174-75.
6. Book length studies of Supreme Court cases and their effects include Hopmis,
DPma Scores CASE (1951), on Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857);- TEN
BROEl, BARNHARr & MIATSON, PREJUDIcE, WAR AND THE CO sTITUTIN (1954), and
GRoDZiNS, AmmacANs BrmAyzm (1949), on Hirabayashi v. United States, 3-0 U.S. 81
(1943), Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Ex airte Endo, 323 U.S.
283 (1944); Hu.L & GREENBERG, CrnizEN's Gumz To DESEGREGATION (1956), and BLAu.
STEIN & FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW (1957), on Brown v. Board uf Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); VosE, CAucAsrAxs Om'y (1959), on Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948). See Fellman, Book Review, 280 ANNALs 182 (1952), for a list of questions
which ought to be answered in case histories.
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perhaps accounts for the existence of many narrow and often contradictory
interpretations of the Court. For students of any complex subject tend to
specialize, and the natural product of specialization is the overemphasis of one
conditioning factor where many are present. Another source of contradiction
is honest interpretation which attempts to aid understanding by oversimplify-
ing complexity. And then there are the disgruntled of each generation who
sum up their view of the Supreme Court in a quip such as "What's the Con-
stitution among friends?" The quips, the conclusions of specialists, and the
broad interpretations have been repeated uncritically when the insights which
many of them display deserve to be accommodated as part of the knowledge
of the subject through evaluation and redefinition. The detailed case history
affords an excellent approach to this end. Through the study of cases, we may
discover what truth lies in the various views of Supreme Court behavior set
out below.
Lest case histories be drawn too narrowly, they might begin by exploring
Justice Jackson's view that "the ultimate function of the Supreme Court is
nothing less than the arbitration between fundamental and ever-present rival
forces or trends in our organized society." 7 He believed that in this way "the
technical tactics of constitutional lawsuits" may be seen as "part of a greater
strategy of statecraft in our system."8' And Justice Frankfurter, prior to his
appointment to the Court, noted:
From Marshall's day to this the pages of the Supreme Court Reports
present a cinematograph of the movements of our society, revealing,
under our "peculiar jurisprudence", the clash of forces in ternis of ordi-
nary lawsuits resolved by the judicial process. Already the substance of
Supreme Court decisions begins to bear the aspects of these times. Sub-
tly the impregnating intellectual climate of an era also affects the Court.
This is so by the very nature of our Constitution, by virtue of the vague
concepts that have to be applied and the "moods" that have to be con-
veyed-a very different thing, 'be it noted, from the shallow implications
of Mr. Dooley's "th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns."0
A theory that judicial decisions are primarily responses to the machinations
of specific pressure groups has also been advanced. In 1908, Arthur F. Bent-
ley wrote that there were "luminous instances of the same group pressures
which operate through executives and legislatures, operating also through
supreme courts and bringing about changes . . . which must be interpreted
7. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 31.1 (1941).
8. Id. at 311-12.
9. Frankfurter & Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1933,
48 HARV. L. REv. 238 (1934). Edward S. Corwin has observed "that for considerable in-
tervals it [the Supreme Court] will be found to be under the sway of a Particular 'social
philosophy,' the operation of which in important cases becomes a matter of fairly easy
prediction on the part of those who follow the Court's work with some care." CORWIN,
THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 253 (12th ed. 1958). Corwin had in
mind the outlook of the judges, but apparently, when the New York Times declared, the
day after the Court announced its decision in the School Segregation Cases, that the
result had been "inevitable," it was speaking of the "spirit of the times." N.Y. Times,
May 18, 1954, p. 28, col. 1.
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directly in terms of pressures of group interests."' 0 Yet in discussing an ex-
ample, Bentley explained he did not mean "that the justices consciously forced
the law to fit the case, nor that they showed any traces whatever of demagog-
ism or of subserviency to pcpular clamor."" In answer to a similar, but more
recent description of the judicial process in terms of access by pressure groups,
Walter Berns has said that such groups
must come armed with sound arguments, addressed to reason. The prop-
osition that the judicial process can be understood in terms of the pres-
sure exerted by groups cannot be maintained-unless that pressure takes
the form of constitutional arguments. And this kind of pressure may be
exerted by an insignificant author of a law review article.' 2
Although it is apparent that important constitutional questions are pressed on
to the Supreme Court by organized groups, certainly it by no means follows
that this factor necessarily accounts for a particular decision. For one thing,
there commonly are important organizations supporting opposing po!itions.
For another, the effectiveness of interest groups in American government
generally has recently been questioned.' 3
Even those who emphasize the competing social pressures in American con-
stitutional law have not lost sight of the key role of the lawyers who trans-
formed these pressures into legal arguments. Judge Simeon Baldwin once -aid
that the development of law "is primarily the work of the lawyer. It is the
adoption by the judge of what is proposed at the bar."' 4 Applying this theory,
Benjamin Twiss showed how, in the years between 1880 and 1935, lawyers
like John A. Campbell, Joseph H. Choate, and William D. Guthrie linked the
currents of economic laissez faire to protective rules of constitutional law.',
Although the advocates of the last century who placed new concepts before
the judges sometimes originated them, as often as not they drew their ideas
from the law textbooks. The influence of Thomas M. Cooley, Christopher G.
Tiedeman, and John F. Dillon, the most prolific la-%v writers of the day, has
been traced in an important study which broadens the work of Twiss. The
thesis of this study is that these authorities, "not less than the judges and the
lawyers, were responsible for the popularization within their profession of
constitutional principles which encompassed the laissez faire policies demanded
10. BE- .Y, THE PROCESS OF GovERNMENT 388 (1908).
11. Id. at 393.
12. BERs, FRmoax, VuTUE AND THE FrosT AmENDMENT 133 (1957). His criticism
was leveled at TRtumA, TE GOVERNMENT PROCESS (1951), especially ch. 15.
13. For a general critique, see Kariel, Political Science in the United States: Re-
flections on One of its Trends, 4 POLITIcAL STUDIES 113 (1956).
14. Quoted in Twiss, LAwYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION 2 (1942).
15. Twiss, LAwYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1942).
That a similar role has been played by lawyers on other questions in other eras is
suggested by the careers of Daniel Webster and Thurgood Marshall, but the precise place
of counsel in relation to other factors in Supreme Court cases remains to be spelled out.
For a classic discussion, see the chapter on constitutional law and Daniel Webster in I
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNiTED STATES HISTORY 63&-728 (rev. ed. 1928). On
Thurgood Marshall, see RFDDING, THE LoNEsouE ROAD 315-29 (1958). See also FnA.nE,
MARmE PALACE 97-101 (1958).
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by industrial capitalists."' 6 Thus, textbooks, and those other books which form
or express the social conscience or outlook of an age may be even more im-
portant than the law men.17 Diligent research might discover that the judges
were swayed by reading outside the case itself.18 \
The most obvious formal means for the passage of ideas or doctrines to the
justices-the record, the briefs, and oral argument-have received credit from
time to time.19 In preparing detailed case histories an appraisal may be made
between the overall effectiveness of each side of a litigation.
The backgrounds of Supreme Court Justices are often isolated as the deter-
minants of a decision. When a majority of the Court ruled a state minimum
wage law invalid, Mr. Justice Stone found it "difficult to imagine any grounds,
other than our own personal economic predilections," for the decision. 20 Some
scholars, like Fred Rodell, have seen a direct inescapable line between per-
sonal, social, and economic background and constitutional decisions. 21 Yet in
a recent study John Schmidhauser states that "investigation of the relative in-
fluence of social background factors upon judicial interpretation has scarcely
progressed beyond the speculative stage." 22 His conclusion to a preliminary
study was that the influence of background factors has been only to set "im-
plicit limits on the scope of theoretical decision-making possibilities.1 23
Judicial biography cannot end with social background as the major deter-
minant of policy preferences, for men take on new commitments as judges.
It may be, as Pritchett and others have claimed, that judicial attitudes toward
values can be plotted to show a conservative-liberal split on the Supreme
Court.2 4 Others have departed altogether from analyzing judicial behavior and
16. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS V (1954).
17. The alleged influence of SIENcER, SOCIAL STATICS (1851), is legend. But, see also
GOLDMARK, FATIGUE AND EFFICIENCY (1912).
The medium of innovation changes so that in our own day the law reviews appear to
lead the way toward new formulations of law. See Newland, Legal Periodicals and the
United States Supreme Court, 3 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 58 (1959). A related study is
Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in
1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1954).
18. See Armstrong, What Do the Justices Read? Books of Interest to Supreme Court
Members, 35 A.B.A.J. 295 (1949).
19. See generally WIENER, EFFECTIVE APPFLLATE ADVOCACY (1950); Harlan, What
Part Does the Oral Arguemnent Play in the Conduct of an Appeal, in U.S. FOURTH CiR-
CUIT JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT (1955).
20. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 633 (1936) (dissenting
opinion).
When the Court ruled that state courts may not constitutionally award damages when
a racial restrictive covenant is broken, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson felt his colleagues had
followed their personal "predilections on social policy" and "a simple self-serving process
of argument" in reaching the result. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 266, 269 (1953)
(dissenting opinion).
21. See generally RODELL, NINE MEN (1955).
22. Schmidhauser, The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait, 3 MID.
WEST J. Pot. Sci. 1, 2 (1959).
23. Id. at 49.
24. See PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948) ; PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
THE VINSON COURT (1954).
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conceived of decisionmaking as a game or in terms of a mathematical model. -
A danger in these approaches, as with the emphasis on social factors, arises
when the quality of judicial open-mindedness is underplayed.2u The extent to
which judges can effectively antisepticize personal views or passioln. in given
cases will be difficult to say, but it is a factor which cannot be excluded from
analysis.
The crowning complexity in the judicial process of the Supreme Court-
the interaction among the justices-is surely the most difficult to grasp. Popu-
lar writing about the Court has often given great play to the personal animos-
ities which arise between Justices.2 7 A recent account by Westin himself, based
on his extensive study of the life of the first fr. Justice Harlan, shows that
these rivalries may bear on such seeming trivialities as the framing of a head-
note in the Court reports.28 It is not clear how much actual decisions may be
colored by this factor. Indeed, the intra-Court picture made available in Alex-
ander Bickel's study of Brandeis emphasizes reason and statesmanship in the
internal deliberations of the Justices.20 The requirements of secrecy, the length
of time which passes betAveen decision and disclosure, indeed, the inconclusive
nature of the debate over full disclosure-all contrive to make accurate con-
temporary analysis of the factor of interaction difficult," For these reasons
case histories might best deal with decisions of times past. But the difficulty
of getting the facts should not exclude mention of the place of interaction
within the Court from the larger framework of detailed case histories. In fact.
one of the advantages of a case history is that it can focus on the particular
Justices, their relationships and deliberations rather than oin an institution
which has, in the course of time, varied enormously.-"
25. See Schubert, The Study of Judicial Decision-Making as an Aspect o4 Political
Behavior, 52 Ams. Poi. Sci. REv. 1007 (1958) ; Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Decisions
Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the "Right to Counsel" Cases, 51 X m. PoL
ScL REv. 1 (1957); Fisher, The Mathematical Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions:
The Use and Abuse of Quantitative Methods, 52 Am. Poi- Sc. REv. 321 (1958 ; Roche,
Political Science and Science Fiction, 52 Ams. Por. Sa. RM. 1026 (1958,.
26. It has been said for Mr. Justice Brandeis that "almost the paramount quality of
a good judge was the capacity to be reached by reason, the freedom from self-pride that
without embarrassment permits a change of mind." Freund, Introduction to Bicnn., ThE
UNPUBLISHED OPINxoxs OF 6Ma. JusricE BRANDEIS at xx (1957). See also FREmU., O.N
U.NDERSTANDING TuE SUPRmE CoURT 45-75 (1949). And Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speak-
ing of "the qualities which should be sought for in members of the Supreme Court," has
said: "The first requisite is disinterestedness; the second requisite is disinterestedness;
the third is disinterestedness." Frankfurter, Judge Henry IW. Edgerton, 43 Coa:RL. LQ.
161, 162 (1957).
27. See, e.g., PEAsox, THE NiNE OLD MN (1937): Schlesinger, Supreme Court
1947, Fortune, Jan. 1947, p. 73.
28. Westin, Stephen J. Field and the Headnote to OWeil v. Vermont: A Snapshot
of the Fuller Court at Work, 67 YALE LJ. 363 (1958).
29. BicK L., op. cit. supra note 26.
30. Discussions of this problem are to be found in id. at vii-Lx; Westin, Book Re-
view, 66 YALE L.J. 462, 468-69 (1957).
31. In this latter connection, studies which treat the Court as an ever-changing "small
group?' contribute a helpful thought. Snyder, The Supreme Court as a Stall Group, 36
Soc.AL FoacFs 232 (1958).
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Although The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case touches many of
these factors, none is examined systematically. One reason for this failure is
Westin's concern with the wisdom of the decision-with evaluating judicial
statesmanship-rather than with how and why the decision was made. His
questions for analysis suggested to students at the end of the book bear on the
rightness of the decision.32 This is the conventional approach, a valuable one for
political scientists and lawyers who follow the work of the Court. Yet it seems
to me that if this was Westin's main purpose, or even a secondary purpose,
he should have provided the reader with more appropriate information on
which to form such a judgment. For example, inclusion of the affidavits pre-
pared for the President by Secretary of Defense Lovett and other officials at
the time of the seizure, 33 along with evaluations made by economists after the
crisis was over, would have enabled the student to evaluate the correctness of
the economic analyses on which the President acted. As it is, Westin's book
partly touches the wisdom of decision and partly the process of decision. Both
might have been brought off; as it is neither approach is adequately followed
through.
To justify the title and achieve his idea of "an explanatory model."3 4 \Vest-
in needed to ask appropriate questions about the development of the case and,
if necessary, seek new information. At many points in the book the failure to
ask a pertinent question, to provide alternative explanations or to include
additional information causes disappointment.
Documents alone could scarcely reveal the liabilities which the Trunan ad-
ministration carried into the Steel Seizure Case. The President's weakness as
a lameduck, following his announcement in March 1952 that he would not
seek reelection, is mentioned, 35 but the evident confusion among his legal ad-
visors is not. The author tells us that the resignation of J. Howard McGrath
and the failure of the Senate to confirm the appointment of James McGranary
left the President without an Attorney General for the duration of the crisis, 0
but there is no indication what difference this made, if any. There is no ex-
planation of the traditional function of the Attorney General, the Solicitor
General, the Assistant Attorney General, the Counsel to the President, or the
General Counsel of the Department of Commerce; and we are told little about
the men holding these positions and their roles in the case. Westin notes that
in December, 1951, "the President had been informed by his 'top advisors'
that they doubted whether there was any 'sound legal basis' for seizing the
steel mills," '37 but that by April, "lawyers in the Justice and Defense Depart-
ments were set to work studying legal bases for Government intervention." 8
Against this one is permitted to wonder why Assistant Attorney General
32. P. 179.
33. See, e.g., 98 CONG. REc. 5848-52 (1952).
34. P. v.
35. P. 2.
36. P. 7. , .




Holmes Baldridge asserted neither statutory nor express constitutional grounds
to support seizure but relied only on "inherent, implied or residual powers"
in responding to Judge Pine's questions about his "client's" powerao And
despite the characterization of Solicitor General Philip Perlman as Acting
Attorney General and "top legal counselor," 40 it is unclear who led the retreat
from that high ground. I have the impression that the President did what he
felt was expedient, and a rather ragged and uncoordinated group of Govern-
ment lawyers then tried to pick up the pieces. Others have said that the Gov-
ernment suffered from self-inflicted wounds. But the relationship between the
White House and the Justice Department is not explored in the book. Thus
we cannot learn whether carelessness or suicidal impulses shaped the Govern-
ment's case.
On the other side, one wonders in what measure the victory of the com-
panies in the Steel Seizure Case was attributable to their outstanding counsel.
A trace of the notion that large corporations have the advantage of top coun-
sel is contained in the book. "Twenty lawyers appeared for the companies and
three for the Government" in the Court of Appeals and this ratio apparently
held throughout.4' If this factor is noteworthy, what inference is to be drawn
from the imbalance? And individually how should the talents of the attorneys
be rated? All we are told about the attorneys for the companies is that John
W. Davis was "a Wall Street lawyer, former Solicitor General of the United
States, presidential candidate of the Democratic Party in 1924, and a veteran
of hundreds of arguments before the Supreme Court." 42 Even if the ultimate
question of significance were reserved, it would be enlightening to know some-
thing of the twenty-seven lawyers named in the United States Reports a.
being on the brief submitted to the Supreme Court for the seven steel com-
panies. 43 I would also like to know how the work was divided and how it was
coordinated. Finally, to what does the author attribute the unerring manage-
ment of the companies' case?
Some of these omissions may be accounted for by the editor's explanation
that his attempt was "to recreate, as far as possible, the factual and emotional
setting of 1952."44 To this end, "the reader has been given approximately the
same facts and rumors which were available to the judges when the steel crisis
was unfolding. 40 However, there is no query about whether the Justices of
the Supreme Court knew either more or less about the developing crisis than
was known to conscientious readers of the New York Times. More important
is the unadorned assumption that the rumors available to the judges are of
significance. How can one know what rumors were heard? How can their
effect on the judgment be gauged ? And what is the student to make of President
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inflaming public opinion were prejudging and deciding the case at the very
time the Court itself was hearing arguments for both sides" ?" What weight
should be given to the fact that the companies protested seizure through news-
paper advertisements? "The Steel Companies in the Wage Dispute" had be-
gun activities in December, 1951 and the advertisements ceased more than a
week before Judge Pine's decision on April 29th. Moreover, the only action
suggested was a letterwriting campaign to Congress. My impression is that the
Supreme Court has not, since 1937 at least, been notably close to the views of
newspaper advertisers or editorial writers. Nor does the report of the Gallup
Poll showing that forty-three per cent of their national sample disapproved of
the steel seizure, while thirty-five per cent approved, and twenty-two per cent
had no opinion seem to prove anything.
47
In a section entitled "Disqualification and the Fortunes of Judicial Rou-
lette,"'48 the point appears to be that it made a difference that District Judge
Valter Bastian, who was first assigned the case, disqualified himself and that
the case was then heard by Judge Pine. judge Bastian withdrew because he
owned a thousand dollars' worth of stock in the Sharon Steel Corporation
and yet Judge Pine, whose wife owned a thousand dollars' worth of stock in
the Bethlehem Steel Company, then heard the case. Would Bastian have de-
cided differently than Pine? We do not know. And, except for the suggestion
that the assignment of judges is a chancy business, we are given no hint of
how such a question might be answered. A discussion of the system of assign-
ing judges in that court would have been helpful. But if the lower court had
acted differently, what bearing would this have had on the ultimate disposition
in the Supreme Court? Again, we do not know, but I believe that such ques-
tions should have been raised directly rather than inferentially.
The section on the Supreme Court is one of the strongest in the book, for
here Westin is able to draw upon his impressive knowledge of the history of
the institution. Because the "inside story" of the Steel Seizure Case is not
available, it was necessary, if anything were to be said, to discuss the inner
workings of the Court in other cases and in earlier periods. This was a sensi-
ble approach. Indeed, one may hope that Westin will some day enlarge upon
his treatment of "How the Supreme Court Reaches Decisions."'49 Thumbnail
sketches of the nine men who decided the Steel Seirure Case are included with
the range of business before them during the 1951 term. The fact that we can
only speculate about how these Justices reached a decision in this case under-
lines the difficulties of doing a thorough case history on a contemporary case.
But hopefully this obstacle as well as the other difficulties in the way of deter-
mining how changes in constitutional law come about will eventually increase
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